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According to Michael Almeida, reflections on free will and possibility can 
be used to show that the existence of an Anselmian God is compatible with 
the existence of evil. These arguments depend on the assumption that an 
agent can be free with respect to an action only if it is possible that that agent 
performs that action. Although this principle enjoys some intuitive sup-
port, I argue that Anselmianism undermines these intuitions by introducing 
impossible options. If Anselmianism is true, I argue, then both God and crea-
tures may be free to do the impossible.
In a number of publications,1 Michael Almeida has argued that the con-
junction of Anselmian theism with the possibility of creaturely free will 
entails that possibly God actualizes a world containing moral evil. The 
argument can be reconstructed as follows:
1. Necessarily, whatever world is actual has been actualized by God.
2. Possibly, some creatures possess morally significant freedom.
3. Necessarily, if some creatures possess morally significant freedom, 
then possibly some creatures commit moral wrongs.2
4. Therefore, possibly God actualizes a world at which some creatures 
commit moral wrongs.
Given standard assumptions about modal logic and possible worlds, the 
argument is valid.3 According to Almeida, this argument provides the 
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1The argument is clearest and most explicit in Almeida, “Bringing About Perfect Worlds.” 
Also see Almeida, Freedom, God, and Worlds, ch. 5; Almeida, “Compatibilism and the Free Will 
Defense,” Almeida, “On Necessary Gratuitous Evils.”
2To avoid ambiguity, this sentence can be formulated in symbols as follows: ☐(MSF → 
◊WRONG), where “MSF” is read as “some creatures possess morally significant freedom” 
and “WRONG” is read as “some creatures commit moral wrongs.”
3Proof: by contraposition, 3 is equivalent to ☐(¬◊WRONG → ¬MSF). By the distribu-
tion axiom, this entails ☐¬◊WRONG → ☐¬MSF. But by the definition of “◊” 2 is equivalent 
to ¬☐¬MSF. Hence, by modus tollens, we have ¬☐¬◊WRONG, i.e., by the definition of “◊,” 
◊◊WRONG. Either S4 or S5 allows the simplification of this sentence to ◊WRONG, i.e., there 
is a possible world at which some creatures commit moral wrongs. However, by premise 
1, any possible world is possibly actualized by God. Therefore, possibly, God actualizes a 
world at which some creatures commit moral wrongs.
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Anselmian theist with a defense against the logical problem of evil which 
does not rely on controversial assumptions about free will:4 the premises 
(Almeida claims) are mutually compatible and jointly entail that possibly 
God coexists with evil. Almeida also suggests that this line of argument 
solves the problem of divine freedom, by showing that God has alterna-
tive possibilities.5
The Anselmian theist is, by definition, committed to premise 1. Morally 
significant freedom is freedom with respect to at least some actions such 
that either doing them is morally wrong or refraining from doing them is 
morally wrong. Since we ordinarily take ourselves actually to possess such 
freedom, premise 2 is extremely plausible. Further, Almeida points out, 
even philosophers who take freedom to be compatible with causal determi-
nation (and/or divine determination) generally take freedom to be incom-
patible with metaphysical necessitation.6 After all, no one can be free to draw 
a round square or to create water that contains no hydrogen. Accordingly, 
premise 3 is also extremely plausible, even on compatibilist views.
Almeida’s argument is valid and Anselmian theists have good reason to 
accept each of its premises. One might think that this is all there is to being a 
good argument. Yet, having admitted all this, I propose to show that this is 
not a good argument—at least not for Almeida’s purposes. This is because 
the Anselmian premise 1 undermines the intuitions that support premise 3.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In section 1, I  argue that the 
Anselmian is committed to the claim that among God’s options are some 
impossibilities. In section 2, I argue that this does not imply the incoherent 
claim that possibly God does the impossible. In section 3, I argue that, if God 
has impossible options, then it is possible that creatures have impossible 
options. Further, if the presence of impossible options for doing evil is 
sufficient for God to have morally significant freedom, it ought to be suffi-
cient for us as well, contrary to Almeida’s premise 3. I conclude, in section 
4, by raising what I call “the Anselmian problem of evil”: if Anselmianism 
is true then it appears that this world should be among God’s impossible 
options, and not among the possible ones. Almeida’s strategy does noth-
ing to dispel this appearance.
1. Anselmianism and Impossible Options
Anselmianism is the view that, necessarily, a maximally great being (God) 
exists, and, necessarily, whatever world is actual is actualized by God.7 
Actualization is an explanatory relation: to say that a world is actualized 
4Almeida, “Compatibilism and the Free Will Defense.”
5Almeida, Freedom, God, and Worlds, §7.0; Almeida, “Bringing About Perfect Worlds,” 
208–209.
6See, e.g., Leibniz, Theodicy, §§34–35, 43–46; Lewis, “Are We Free to Break the Laws?”; 
Vihvelin, Causes, Laws, and Free Will.
7This is a stipulative definition, not a claim about the historical Anselm. I take it this is 
roughly the way Almeida uses the term “Anselmianism” as well.
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by God is to say (in part) that it is because of God’s choice that this world, 
rather than some other world, is actual.
Anselmians hold a variety of views about how precisely God’s creative 
decision works. However, all Anselmians agree that the explanatory order 
in all possible worlds begins with God. Proponents of strong providence 
hold that God selects one precise world to be actual. Anselmians who 
reject strong providence hold that God’s creative choice fixes some range 
of worlds as candidates for actuality, with creaturely free choices (and per-
haps other indeterministic events) being needed to determine which of 
those candidates is actual. What we mean in saying that necessarily what-
ever world is actual is actualized by God is just that God plays this foun-
dational explanatory role.8
No matter what world was actual, according to the Anselmian, it would 
have been actual because of God’s choice. However, there are some consistently 
describable states of affairs such that, necessarily, a maximally great being 
does not actualize a world containing them. It follows that some consistently 
describable states of affairs are impossible because, and only because, neces-
sarily God does not choose to actualize a world containing them. It is in this 
sense that the Anselmian God is the “delimiter of possibilities.”9
Note that this line of thought does not depend on strong providence. 
Even open theists will generally admit that there are some states of 
affairs—for instance, an innocent person being condemned to hell10—such that 
8Thus, throughout this paper, I use “actualize” to mean roughly what Plantinga—and 
Almeida following him—calls “weak actualization” (Plantinga, Nature of Necessity, 172–173; 
Almeida, Freedom, God, and Worlds, 56–57; Almeida, “Unrestricted Actualization,” 213–214). 
However, I find Plantinga’s way of distinguishing between strong and weak actualization 
problematic. According to Plantinga (and Almeida) an agent strongly actualizes those states 
of affairs she causes to be actual, and (merely) weakly actualizes those she actualizes without 
causing. I have elsewhere argued that God should be understood as the ground, rather than 
the cause, of the universe (“Foundational Grounding”; “Counterpossible Dependence”). 
Hence, on Plantinga’s definitions, my view would be one in which God does not strongly 
actualize anything. Insofar as the distinction between strong and weak actualization is sup-
posed to be doing philosophical work regarding free will and the problem of evil, this seems 
like the wrong result.
9Morris, Anselmian Explorations, 47–48. Linda Zagzebski, The Dilemma of Freedom and 
Foreknowledge, 111–113 takes this observation to motivate the rejection of S4 (which would 
invalidate Almeida’s argument). However, once we have admitted that there are consistently 
describable states of affairs such that, necessarily, God chooses contrary to them, I do not see 
why we should not admit that God’s choosing contrary to them is necessarily necessary, as 
required by S4.
10Condemning the innocent is used by Leibniz (“Observations on the Book Concerning 
‘the Origin of Evil,’” §21) as an example of something obviously inconsistent with the divine 
nature. The example also appears in Pruss, “Divine Creative Freedom,” §V.4. I take no posi-
tion, in the present paper, on the controversial question of whether condemning unrepentant 
sinners to hell is consistent with the divine nature. On this question, see Adams, “Hell and 
the God of Justice”; Talbott, “The Doctrine of Everlasting Punishment”; Kvanvig, The Problem 
of Hell; Sider, “Hell and Vagueness”; Hershenov, “The Fairness of Hell.” The question of 
whether it is consistent with Anselmianism that there should ever be any sinners in the first 
place will be discussed in §4, below.
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a necessarily existent and essentially perfectly good God would necessar-
ily ensure that they do not become actual.
This much is widely accepted by Anselmian theists.11 However, it has 
a consequence that Anselmians have not frequently emphasized or made 
explicit. Say that a state of affairs is among an agent’s options iff: (a) in choos-
ing what to do, the agent takes reasons for and/or against that state of affairs 
into account,12 and (b) whether the state of affairs becomes actual depends 
explanatorily on the agent’s choice.13 (I will also sometimes speak of an action 
being among an agent’s options. The definition is precisely analogous.)
To say that a state of affairs depends explanatorily on an agent’s choice 
is to say that it is because of the agent’s choice that the state of affairs is 
either actual or not. For instance, supposing I raise my hand, clause (b) is 
satisfied if my raising my hand is explained by my choosing to raise my 
hand. Supposing I do not raise my hand, clause (b) is satisfied if my not 
raising my hand is explained by my not choosing to raise my hand.14
I assume that having an action among one’s options, in the sense 
defined, is necessary, though perhaps insufficient, for being free with 
respect to that action.15 The relevance of options to freedom will be dis-
cussed in more detail in section 3, below. Our present question is, which 
states of affairs are among God’s options?
Regardless of one’s particular views about providence and free will, 
it follows from the basic Anselmian assumption that every possible state 
of affairs satisfies clause (b) with respect to God. Even if (as the denier of 
strong providence holds) God only selects a family of candidate worlds, 
rather than one precise world, still every actual contingent state of affairs 
is actual because of God’s choice. For instance, even if God did not deter-
mine me to write this paper, it is partly because of God’s creative choice 
that the state of affairs my writing this paper is actual: God chose that the 
universe should exist, that it should have the laws it does, etc., having at 
least the knowledge that it might lead to my writing this paper. Further, 
God certainly knew how to prevent my writing this paper if God so chose. 
Regardless of whether the Anselmian endorses strong providence, it is 
a core commitment of Anselmianism that every possible state of affairs 
11See, e.g., Garcia, “A Response to the Modal Problem of Evil”; Talbott, “On the Divine 
Nature and the Nature of Divine Freedom”; Tidman, “The Epistemology of Evil Possibilities”; 
Kraay, “Theism and Modal Collapse”; Pruss, “Divine Creative Freedom,” 231–235; Byerly, 
“The All-Powerful, Perfectly Good, and Free God.” However, a few broadly Anselmian phi-
losophers have attempted to avoid this result by denying that (the individual who is) God is 
essentially morally perfect. See, e.g., Pike, “Omnipotence and God’s Ability to Sin”; Manis, 
“Could God Do Something Evil?”; Howard-Snyder, “Divine Freedom.”
12Reasons may be taken into account without being explicitly considered. See Pearce, “Are 
We Free to Break the Laws of Providence?” 160.
13This notion of “having an option” is borrowed from Pearce, “Are We Free to Break the 
Laws of Providence?” 160.
14Pearce, “Are We Free to Break the Laws of Providence?” 161.
15For further discussion of this concept of “having an option” and its relation to human 
freedom, see Pearce, “Are We Free to Break the Laws of Providence?”
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depends explanatorily on God, since God provides the ultimate explana-
tion of why things are so and not otherwise.
Further, from the fact that the Anselmian God is the delimiter of possi-
bilities, in the sense explained above, it follows that at least some impossi-
ble states of affairs depend on God’s choice in the way required by clause 
(b). The innocent do not suffer in hell because God chooses to ensure that 
they do not. It is impossible that the innocent suffer in hell because neces-
sarily God chooses to ensure that they do not. Hence, at least some impos-
sible states of affairs satisfy clause (b) with respect to God.
The Anselmian is committed to the claim that certain states of affairs 
are impossible precisely because God necessarily chooses against them. 
God’s necessarily choosing against them is explained by the reasons God 
has against them. Thus, God takes these reasons into account in creat-
ing. It follows that these impossible states of affairs will satisfy clause (a). 
These, however, are the very same impossible states of affairs—such as the 
innocent suffering in hell—which, I argued above, satisfy clause (b). Hence, 
at least some impossible states of affairs are among God’s options.
2. Options and Possibilities
It may be thought that the result of the previous section is incoherent, and 
that we must therefore either show how the Anselsmian can avoid it or 
else abandon Anselmian theism. There are two prima facie plausible prin-
ciples, either of which would suffice to generate this conclusion:
1. If a state of affairs is among an agent’s options, then possibly that 
agent brings about that state of affairs.
2. If a state of affairs is among an agent’s options, then possibly that 
agent chooses to bring about that state of affairs.
In this section, I argue that the Anselmian has good reason to reject both 
of these principles.
Principle 1 looks quite plausible in certain cases. For instance, drawing a 
round square is not among my options since it is not possible that I draw a 
round square. But if this principle is accepted in full generality, the position 
outlined above is incoherent: for any state of affairs s, if s is among God’s 
options then possibly God actualizes s. But, necessarily, if God actualizes s, 
then s is actual. Possibly p and necessarily if p then q together imply possibly 
q.16 Therefore, possibly s is actual. Therefore, God does not have impossible 
options.
However, the plausibility of principle 1 extends only to those cases 
where the intrinsic impossibility of the option explains why the agent does 
16This inference rule is symbolized: ◊p, ☐ (p → q) ⊢ ◊q. So far as I know, the validity of this 
rule, involving a necessitated material conditional, is uncontested. It is implied by every ver-
sion of the possible worlds model theory: if some p-world is possible, and every p-world is a 
q-world, then some q-world is possible. This should not be confused with the “Strangeness of 
Impossibility Condition,” a contested principle involving subjunctive conditionals. See note 
41 in the Appendix, below.
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not possibly bring it about.17 This will be intuitive in human cases involv-
ing nomological possibility. Running 90 miles in an hour is not among my 
options because (given how my body is constituted) it is nomologically 
impossible that I do so. But consider another case. Suppose I know that a 
certain cup contains concentrated bleach. It may be that, given the current 
state of my mind/brain it is nomologically impossible that I intentionally 
drink the contents of the cup, but this is not because of any nomological 
impossibility in the action itself. Rather, it is because I see overwhelming 
reason against the action, and my psychological constitution is not such as 
to allow me to choose against such overwhelming reasons (at least with-
out some strong irrational temptation on the other side). We’ve described 
the action in question as an intentional, and hence chosen, action. In order 
for the reasons against it to serve as an explanation of its (nomological) 
impossibility (in the described circumstances), those reasons must be 
weighed by an agent (me), the outcome of this weighing must depend on 
those reasons, and this outcome must (nomologically) guarantee that the 
action is not chosen. Hence this nomologically impossible action must be 
among my options. (Before you accuse me of begging questions in the 
free will debate, remember: my notion of having an option is stipulative, 
I haven’t said anything about whether I am able to drink the bleach, and 
I haven’t yet said anything about whether I’m free to drink the bleach. The 
point is simply that my not drinking the bleach is explained by the reasons 
I have for not doing so.)
The nomological impossibility of a given action would not prevent God 
from performing it. If God refrains from breaking the laws of nature, it is 
because God chooses to refrain. As a result, God’s refraining from break-
ing the laws of nature is always like my refraining from drinking bleach, 
and never like my refraining from running 90 miles in an hour. In short, 
the impossible options to which, I have argued, the Anselmian is commit-
ted are extrinsic impossibilities, i.e., states of affairs in their own nature 
possible but necessarily not actualized by God and therefore necessarily 
non-actual.18 However, principle 1 is plausible only as applied to intrinsic 
impossibilities.
Similar considerations apply to principle 2. In ordinary cases it is plau-
sible to suppose that an action is not among my options unless it is pos-
sible for me to choose it. However, this again depends on the reason for 
the impossibility. Suppose I have a phobia of flying. Suppose further that 
I believe about myself that if I decide to get on an airplane I will be in a 
state of severe emotional agitation for the entirety of the flight, but never-
theless I will get on the plane. I therefore weigh the unpleasantness of this 
experience against the importance of arriving quickly at my destination. 
17On intrinsic impossibility, see Garcia, “A Response to the Modal Problem of Evil,” 
383–385.
18But for an argument that the Anselmian should endorse a stronger view, on which even 
logical contradictions are among God’s options, see the Appendix below.
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The conclusion of my deliberation is that I should take the flight. Suppose 
I even successfully choose to buy the ticket. Nevertheless, it may be that, 
when I actually arrive at the airport, I find it impossible to choose to walk 
down the jetway and get on the plane. It is at least conceivable that the 
state of my mind/brain might be such that this is a genuine nomological 
impossibility. This kind of “volitional disability,” as Gary Watson19 calls it, 
might actually take away my options. That is, it might either prevent me 
from actually taking the reasons for and against the choice into account, or 
it might prevent the outcome from depending on my choice.
But consider an alternative case. Suppose that instead of a phobia I have 
a strong commitment to reducing my carbon footprint, and suppose there 
is a much more environmentally friendly option that will be only a little 
worse than flying with respect to time, expense, and hassle. In such a case 
it might be nomologically necessary, given my psychological state (includ-
ing my values and my knowledge of these facts), that unless something 
interferes with my deliberation the outcome will be that I choose not to fly. 
In such a case, the explanation of my necessarily not flying is found within 
my process of deliberation. Thus, the explanation of why I necessarily do 
not fly actually requires that flying be among my options.
The Anselmian God necessarily values things in proportion to their 
goodness, necessarily knows all the facts, and could not err or be dis-
rupted in weighing options. As a result, there will be states of affairs that, 
necessarily, God does not choose. This does not prevent these states of 
affairs from being among God’s options, in the sense defined.
3. Might We Have Impossible Options?
As indicated above, I assume that having an action among one’s options is 
necessary, though perhaps insufficient, for being free with respect to that 
action. We have seen that, for us, the nomological necessity (given cer-
tain background conditions) of choosing against a certain action need not 
remove it from the menu of options. Further, we have seen that, for God, 
even metaphysical necessity need not remove an action from the menu of 
options. I now argue that, given Anselmianism, it is quite plausible that 
ordinary creatures like us could have metaphysically impossible options. 
Because an action’s being among one’s options may not be sufficient for 
being free with respect to that action, this does not immediately refute 
Almeida’s premise 3. However, it does undermine many of the intuitions 
that motivate that premise. This is sufficient to render Almeida’s argu-
ment ineffective for its intended purpose.
3.1 Prevented Options
For the moment, let us restrict our attention to those Anselmians who 
endorse theories of providence stronger than open theism. Call these 
19Agency and Answerability, ch. 4.
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philosophers providential Anselmians. The extent to which my argument 
applies to open theists will be addressed in section 3.4, below.
I have previously argued that providential Anselmianism gives rise to 
what I call prevented options: actions that are genuinely among an agent’s 
options although God has decided to ensure that the agent does not choose 
them. I have further argued that these theories are committed to the claim that 
we may be free to perform actions that are among our prevented options.20 
Without repeating the details of that argument, an example will suffice to 
give the general idea. Suppose (to adapt a toy example from Hunt21) that 
there is a game show in which the contestant chooses one of three doors and 
receives the prize behind it. Suppose further that God wants to ensure that 
Sue does not choose Door #1 or Door #2, but God wants to leave Sue’s free 
will intact. If theological compatibilism is true,22 God can just decree that 
Sue will choose Door #3, and this (according to the compatibilist) need not 
interfere with Sue’s free will. If Molinism is true,23 then God knows whether 
it is true that if Sue were a contestant, she would choose Door #3, and God can 
ensure that Sue will not be a contestant unless this conditional is true. If the 
simple foreknowledge theory of providence is true,24 then God can employ 
foreknowledge of which door the contestant will choose and ensure that Sue is 
the contestant if, but only if, the contestant will choose Door #3. In both the 
Molinist and the simple foreknowledge case (and possibly, depending on 
the details, in the compatibilist case), it is true that if Sue had not been going 
to choose Door #3, she would not have been the contestant. Nevertheless, these 
theories are committed to the claim that the other doors are among Sue’s 
options and, indeed, that she is free to choose them.25
I call Sue’s condition in these cases finkish backtracking.26 In the literature 
on dispositions and abilities, a disposition or ability is finkish if it would 
20Pearce, “Are We Free to Break the Laws of Providence?”
21Hunt, “Prescience and Providence,” 437.
22Theological compatibilism (as that term is used in discussions of divine providence) is 
the view that creatures may be free even if God determines their choices. For defense of this 
view, see McCann, Creation and the Sovereignty of God.
23Molinism is the view that God makes providential use of knowledge of contingent but 
pre-volitional counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. For defense of this view see Flint, Divine 
Providence.
24By “the simple foreknowledge theory of providence,” I  mean the conjunction of the 
following three theses: (a) God makes providential use of simple knowledge of the actual 
future; (b) God does not make providential use of simple knowledge of counterfactuals of 
creaturely freedom; and (c) this allows God greater providential control than God would 
have without using simple knowledge of the actual future. By “simple knowledge” I mean 
knowledge not inferred from anything else. For defense of this view see Hunt, “Divine 
Providence and Simple Foreknowledge”; Hunt, “Prescience and Providence.” Insofar as this 
is a theory of providence, it is not an account of what knowledge God has but rather an 
account of what knowledge God uses providentially. If God has additional knowledge that is 
“screened off” from providential use, this is not relevant here.
25For a detailed defense of the claims made in this paragraph, see Pearce, “Are We Free to 
Break the Laws of Providence?”
26Pearce, “Are We Free to Break the Laws of Providence?” 163–164.
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be lost if the conditions for its exercise occurred.27 Finkish backtracking 
occurs when an ability or disposition is such that if it had been going to be 
exercised it never would have been possessed in the first place. Prevented 
options generally involve finkish backtracking, and theories of providence 
stronger than open theism give rise to them.
3.2 From Prevented Options to Impossible Options
There are some outcomes that are so bad that, necessarily, the Anselmian 
God prevents them. There are consistently describable states of affairs that 
involve such outcomes being brought about by the free actions of crea-
tures, and there are consistently describable states of affairs that involve 
creatures freely deciding not to bring about such outcomes. Any version of 
Anselmianism is committed to the claim that the former states of affairs, 
though consistent, are metaphysically impossible. However, if prevented 
options are possible, then the latter states of affairs should be possible. For 
instance, it is consistent with Anselmianism to suppose that God should 
allow some creature to choose whether the innocent should suffer in hell, 
provided God ensures that that creature will choose not to condemn the 
innocent.28
Suppose that God delegates to some creature (call him “Charon”) this 
task of judgment, and suppose someone offers Charon a bribe to condemn 
an innocent person. Charon, let us suppose, rejects the bribe because 
he correctly recognizes the moral value of just judgment and sees that 
upholding this value is inconsistent with accepting the bribe. In this case, 
does Charon have the option of accepting the bribe and condemning the 
innocent?
In order for Charon to have this option, two conditions would need to 
be satisfied: (a) in making his choice, Charon must take reasons for and/
or against the action into account, and (b) whether Charon performs the 
action must depend explanatorily on his choice.
Because Charon acts for a reason in rejecting the bribe, condition (a) 
is clearly satisfied. Condition (b), however, is much more complex. Since 
God has entrusted Charon with the task of judgment, we would expect the 
27See Martin, “Dispositions and Conditionals”; Lewis, “Finkish Dispositions”; Vihvelin, 
Causes, Laws, and Free Will, §6.3.
28Tom Flint’s Molinist defenses of the Incarnation (Flint, “‘A Death He Freely Accepted’”) 
and of Papal infallibility (Flint, Divine Providence, ch. 8) both exhibit precisely the same struc-
ture as the case I am envisioning here: free will is retained although it would be inconsistent 
with God’s character to place that individual in that circumstance if that individual had been 
going to choose badly. Flint explicitly endorses (and attributes to Molina) the view “that 
there is no possible world in which an assumed human nature [i.e., one in which God is 
incarnate] sins” (“A Death He Freely Accepted,” 8–9). Similarly, Flint assumes that, because 
of God’s essential perfect goodness, “Filbert’s [or anyone else’s] election to the papacy entails 
[i.e., metaphysically necessitates] that he doesn’t freely reject God’s guidance and proclaim 
heresy” (Divine Providence, 188), an assumption that leads to certain technical problems 
which Flint discusses at some length.
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conditional if Charon condemned an innocent person, that person would suffer 
in hell to be true, so that the dependency required by condition (b) exists. 
However, the following backtracking conditional also appears to be true: 
if Charon had been going to condemn the innocent, God would not have entrusted 
judgment to Charon. Charon is, in other words, subject to finkish backtracking.
Providential Anselmians are committed to the claim that these two con-
ditionals are consistent, and that a being in such a situation—for instance, 
Sue from the previous subsection—may be free. Charon’s situation differs 
from Sue’s in just one way: Charon’s prevented option is necessarily pre-
vented. Does this prevent Charon from satisfying condition (b)?
The answer is no. In the story described the outcome depends causally, 
and hence explanatorily, on Charon’s choice.
The causal dependence is obvious. Within the structure of the created 
world, Charon has the power to cause or causally prevent damnation, and 
Charon exercises this power to prevent the damnation of the innocent. 
Since causes explain their effects, it follows that it is because of Charon’s 
choice that the innocent are not condemned.29
Given that it is metaphysically impossible that the innocent suffer in 
hell, some may find it odd to suppose that, in the world described, the 
innocent do not suffer in hell because Charon does not condemn them. 
However, the structure here is less exotic than it might first appear. Sara 
Bernstein argues that it is not uncommon for impossible omissions to fig-
ure into causal explanations, even in the actual world. Bernstein gives the 
following examples:30
(a) If the mathematician had not failed to prove that 2 + 2 = 5, children’s 
math textbooks would not have remained the same.
(b) If the mathematician had not failed to prove that 2 + 2 = 5, she would 
not have failed to get a raise.
(c) If the mathematician had not failed to prove that 2 + 2 = 5, her men-
tor would not have remained unimpressed.
It is important to Flint’s approach that there are possible worlds at which a number 
of rather similar things happen. For instance, there are possible worlds at which Christ’s 
Human Nature is not assumed and is therefore an ordinary human being and sins. There 
are possible worlds at which Filbert is not pope and proclaims heresy (perhaps even in cir-
cumstances that would count as speaking ex cathedra if he were pope). And there are possible 
worlds at which God overrides Pope Filbert’s free will to prevent him from proclaiming 
heresy. But the same can be said about my Charon case, discussed below. For instance, there 
are possible worlds at which Charon, after accepting a bribe, says to an innocent person “I 
condemn you!” while falsely believing that this will result in that person being condemned.
29Someone might worry that, since God’s providential plan provides the ultimate expla-
nation of why the innocent do not suffer in hell, Charon’s choice does not provide a genuine 
explanation. However, the providential Anselmian must deny that this kind of providential 
explanation preempts ordinary creaturely explanation, or else she will not be able to main-
tain that created causes in general explain their effects. This denial is not implausible, since 
God’s providential plan provides a very different kind of explanation than the creaturely 
cause. See Pearce, “Foundational Grounding and the Argument from Contingency,” 255–256; 
Pearce, “Are We Free to Break the Laws of Providence?” 163–166.
30Bernstein, “Omission Impossible,” 2583–2584.
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In fact, another example of this phenomenon is of considerable real-world 
importance. It is widely believed to be impossible to construct an efficient 
algorithm for factoring the product of two large prime numbers.31 This 
unproven mathematical conjecture is at the root of all modern cryptogra-
phy, including the technology used to protect online financial transactions. 
Thus: it is because no one has constructed an efficient algorithm for factoring the 
product of two large prime numbers that online banking is reasonably secure. 
Further, this explanatory claim supports counterpossible conditionals: if 
computer hackers had not failed to construct an efficient algorithm for factoring 
the product of two large primes, online banking would be laughably insecure.
One thing is exotic about Charon’s case (and God’s): Charon does not 
perform the impossible action because, and only because, he chooses not 
to. This is not the primary or only reason why people have not proved that 
2 + 2 = 5 or constructed an efficient algorithm for factoring the product of 
two large primes. Nevertheless, the idea that a person’s omitting to do the 
impossible could explain features of a possible world (or even the actual 
world) is not one we should balk at.
I conclude, then, that necessarily prevented options may nonetheless 
be options (in the sense defined). Necessarily prevented options, however, 
are impossible options.
3.3 Free Will Without Alternative Metaphysical Possibilities?
The providential Anselmian is committed to the claim that creatures, as 
well as God, may have impossible options. However, if having an action 
among one’s options is only necessary, and not sufficient, for being free 
with respect to that action, then this does not automatically undermine 
Almeida’s premise 3. What is needed is not the claim that condemning the 
innocent is among Charon’s options, but rather the claim that Charon is 
free to condemn the innocent. Can this gap be bridged?
The key here is that Charon’s situation turns out not to be so different 
from (what the providential Anselmian takes to be) ordinary exercises of 
providence. If God is able to prevent Sue from choosing Door #1 or Door 
#2 while leaving Sue free, then there is no obvious reason why God should 
not be able to prevent Charon from condemning the innocent while leav-
ing him free.
The point is this: it’s not enough to point out that alternative possibili-
ties are lacking. It matters why alternative possibilities are lacking. God’s 
range of options, and God’s freedom, are not diminished by the fact that 
God necessarily chooses against certain options. This theological view 
undermines, or at least casts doubt on, the general intuition about alter-
native possibilities that motivates premise 3 of Almeida’s argument: it is 
possible (at least in the case of God) that an agent may be free to do some-
thing which it is impossible that she do. Additionally, whatever form of 
31By an efficient algorithm we mean, more precisely, one that can be executed in 
polynomial time.
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(direct or indirect) control God might exercise over creaturely free choices, 
the fact that some of God’s choices in the exercise of this control are nec-
essary does not seem to provide any new threat to free will. Charon lacks 
alternative possibilities in precisely the same way and for precisely the 
same reason as Sue, but the providential Anselmian is committed to the 
claim that Sue may be free.
Almeida’s premise 3 was meant to be motivated by the intuition that 
free will requires alternative possibilities. However, the providential 
Anselmian has good reason to hold that, in at least some cases, God can 
ensure that we do not choose certain options without making us unfree 
with respect to those options. This means that the providential Anselmian 
has already rejected the motivating intuition about alternative possibili-
ties. The absence of alternative possibilities alone does not remove free-
dom; it matters why the possibilities are lacking.
Some providential Anselmians may simply insist, as a matter of brute 
intuition, that free will requires at least alternative metaphysical possibil-
ities, and morally significant freedom requires some of these alternative 
metaphysical possibilities to involve wrongdoing. Alternatively, some 
clever providential Anselmian may propose a different way of distin-
guishing Charon’s case from Sue’s and from God’s, that would explain 
why Charon’s impossible options are insufficient for free will. I am not 
prepared to offer a decisive refutation of these views. My present point 
is that premise 1 of Almeida’s argument (divine necessity) undermines 
the standard sources of intuitive support for premise 3 (the requirement 
of alternative possibilities). As a result, Almeida’s argument does more to 
highlight the apparent inconsistency in Anselmianism than to resolve it.
3.4 Open Theism and Impossible Options?
Open theism is the view that God lacks (certain) knowledge of future 
contingents. Typically, open theism is motivated by the idea that God’s 
knowledge would render these future events non-contingent, and hence 
take away creaturely free will.32 I  have just argued that providential 
Anselmianism undermines Almeida’s premise (3). What, though, if the 
Anselmian is an open theist?33
My argument for the claim that God has impossible options is fully 
consistent with open theism. However, my argument from the claim that 
God has impossible options to the claim that we may have impossible 
options depends on the assumption that God can, at least sometimes, pre-
vent us from making certain choices without taking away our options. 
Further, my argument that we may be free with respect to certain impos-
sible actions depended on the providential Anselmian’s commitment to 
32Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge; Hasker, “The Foreknowledge Conundrum”; Rissler, 
“Open Theism,” §3.
33In fact, an anonymous referee suggests that some readers may regard the results of this 
paper so far as an argument in favor of open theism!
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the claim that this kind of providential control is consistent with human 
freedom. Open theists generally reject these views.
What does this mean for my argument? In the first place, note that one 
of the key selling points of Almeida’s response to the problem of evil was 
that it was not supposed to rely on any controversial assumptions about 
free will. However, if the possibility of impossible options undermines 
the argument, then it turns out that the argument does depend on contro-
versial assumptions about free will. Indeed, it will turn out, in this case, 
that Almeida’s free will defense relies on a much stronger view of human 
free will (and a correspondingly weaker view of divine providence) than 
Plantinga’s Molinist defense.
In the second place, the argument from the claim that God may be free 
to perform impossible actions to the claim that we may be free to perform 
impossible actions is in fact more plausible on (most versions of) open the-
ism than on many competing conceptions of God.
Open theists often promote their view as a biblicist and personalist con-
ception of God. That is, (most versions of) open theism take God to be a 
person in something very much like the way humans are persons. This is 
supposed to be an advantage because it allows for a more straightforward 
reading of various biblical narratives about God and it allows for a per-
sonal relationship with God in a straightforwardly literal sense.34 God is, 
in other words, far more similar to us on (most) open theist views than on 
the classical philosophical theology of someone like Aquinas.
Open theists often regard free will as a central component of person-
hood. Further, open theists often emphasize that their view allows God to 
respond freely to our prayers.35 But I have argued that Anselmians—even 
those who are open theists—must hold that the options among which God 
freely chooses include some impossibilities. If divine and human freedom 
are as similar as open theists suggest, then it seems difficult for the open 
theist to rule out the possibility that the options among which we freely 
choose may sometimes include impossibilities.
Admittedly this argument is merely suggestive. The open theist obvi-
ously does not think that God is exactly like us. Further, open theism does 
not have the same mechanism for the generation of creaturely impossible 
options that exists in stronger views of providence. Thus, we can say that, 
while stronger views of providence are committed to the claim that we can 
have impossible options and this is consistent with freedom, open theism 
merely suggests that this might be the case. However, we may still say—
even on open theism—that Almeida’s Anselmian premise (1) casts doubt 
on his premise (3), the alternative possibilities requirement for freedom. 
The strength of this doubt will be directly proportional to the strength of 
one’s theory of providence.
34See Pinnock, et al. The Openness of God; Rissler, “Open Theism.”
35Basinger, “Practical Implications;” Rissler, “Open Theism,” §4.
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4. The Anselmian Problem of Evil
The ramifications of these observations for Anselmian discussions of the 
problem of evil are severe. The central commitment of Anselmianism, 
expressed in premise 1 above, is an explanatory claim: this world is actual 
because God chose that it be actual. Further, every possible world is such 
that, had it been actual, it would have been actual because of God’s choice. 
This seems to imply that the non-actuality of other worlds can be explained 
in the same way: they are non-actual because God did not choose them 
and actuality is conferred only by divine choice. Among those options 
God did not choose, there are some that God necessarily did not choose 
because of the decisive reasons against them.
This, however, is precisely the problem: the actual world has numerous 
features that we would expect to count as decisive reasons against actu-
alizing it. For instance, the presence of even a single genocide appears to 
be a decisive reason against actualizing a world. In this world there were 
several of these in the 20th century alone. On Anselmianism, if God has 
decisive reason against actualizing this world, then this world is not so 
much as possible. Yet, somehow, this world is actual.
Almeida’s response to this is as follows. God is able to actualize a world 
at which creatures freely refrain from genocide. Yet no one freely refrains 
from genocide unless it is possible that that person commits genocide, and 
it is not possible that a person commit genocide unless it is possible that 
God actualizes a world at which that person commits genocide.36 As we 
have seen, though, there are reasons internal to Anselmianism for finding 
this argument’s assumptions about freedom and possibility dubious.
The moral of the story is that the problem of evil for the Anselmian 
is harder than Almeida takes it to be. The reason for this lies in the dis-
tinctive explanatory structure of Anselmianism, which takes divine choice 
to be the root explanation of why things are as they are and takes this 
explanatory structure to apply at every possible world. Anselmianism 
is, in Timothy O’Connor’s phrase,37 a thesis about the necessary shape 
of contingency. As a result of this commitment, it is insufficient for the 
Anselmian to argue that this world is among God’s options.38 The charge 
to which the Anselmian must reply is the charge that choosing this world 
is inconsistent with the character that would be possessed by a maximally 
great being. To this allegation, Almeida has offered no reply at all.39
Appendix: Does God have Logically Impossible Options?
In sections 1 and 2, I argued that the Anselmian is committed to the claim 
that among God’s options are some impossibilities. However, this does 
not (incoherently) imply that these impossibilities are possible. In this 
36Almeida, “Compatibilism and the Free Will Defense,” 63–67.
37O’Connor, Theism and Ultimate Explanation.
38In fact, in the Appendix below, I argue that even contradictions are among God’s options.
39I thank Scott Hill and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on a previous draft.
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appendix, I present a quick argument for the claim that even logical con-
tradictions are among God’s options.
An adequate analysis of divine omnipotence should hold that, neces-
sarily, God’s will is perfectly efficacious.40 In order for this view to be log-
ically consistent, it must be held that it is impossible that God will logical 
contradictions.41 However, it seems inappropriate, from the perspective of 
Anselmian perfect being theology, to imagine logic as an unwanted con-
straint on God’s activity—to imagine, for instance, that God wishes that 
there were round squares, but God just can’t bring Godself to make any. It 
seems better, from an Anselmian perspective, to hold that God values or 
endorses the laws of logic in such a way as to regard the fact that a state 
of affairs contains a contradiction as a decisive reason against bringing 
about that state of affairs.42 One way of expressing this view is to say that, 
from God’s perspective absolutely nothing—not even a round square—is 
intrinsically impossible. God, on this view, is the delimiter of possibilities 
in such a strong sense that all impossibilities are ultimately explained by 
the ways God’s character shapes God’s willing. If the Anselmian holds 
this view, then she will be committed to claiming that all impossibilities 
are in fact among God’s options.
40Pearce and Pruss, “Understanding Omnipotence,” 405–409; Adams, “A New Paradox of 
Omnipotence”; Pearce, “Counterpossible Dependence and the Efficacy of the Divine Will”; 
Byerly, “The All-Powerful, Perfectly Good, and Free God,” 23.
41Pearce and Pruss, “Understanding Omnipotence,” 410; Pearce, “Counterpossible 
Dependence and the Efficacy of the Divine Will,” 7–8, 12. The argument for this claim 
depends on a principle of counterfactual reasoning that Daniel Nolan (“Impossible 
Worlds,” 550–551) has called the “Strangeness of Impossibility Condition.” Different 
authors give this rule in either of two closely related formulations: ◊p, p ☐→ q ⊢ ◊q or 
◊p, ☐q ⊢ p ☐→ q. On a “closest world” approach to counterfactuals, either formulation is 
equivalent to the claim that every possible world is closer to the actual world than any 
impossible world.
Either formulation clearly validates the inference in the text. Suppose that ◊(God wills 
that 2 + 2 = 5) and ((God wills that 2 + 2 = 5) ☐→ 2 + 2 = 5). By the first formulation it 
follows, absurdly, that ◊(2 + 2 = 5). Similarly, suppose that ◊(God wills that 2 + 2 = 5) and 
☐¬(2 + 2 = 5). Then, by the second formulation, (God wills that 2 + 2 = 5) ☐→ ¬(2 + 2 = 5). 
Thus, given the Strangeness of Impossibility Condition (on either formulation), the sup-
position that ◊(God wills that 2 + 2 = 5) is incompatible with the supposition that God 
possesses perfect efficacy of will in the sense defined in Pearce and Pruss, “Understanding 
Omnipotence,” 410.
Recently, some philosophers have questioned or rejected the Strangeness of Impossibility 
Condition (e.g., Nolan, “The Extent of Metaphysical Necessity,” 330; Bernstein, “Omission 
Impossible,” 2581–2582; Kocurek, “On the Substitution of Identicals in Counterfactual 
Reasoning”). However, the principle is either an axiom or a theorem in many accounts of 
subjunctive conditionals, including those that allow for non-trivial counterpossibles. See, 
e.g., Mares, “Who’s Afraid of Impossible Worlds?” 521–522; Berto et  al., “Williamson on 
Counterpossibles,” 697. The Strangeness of Impossibility Condition also plays a crucial role 
in Marc Lange’s theory of modality, serving to differentiate the various species of necessity 
(Lange, Laws and Lawmakers).
42Pearce and Pruss, “Understanding Omnipotence,” 410–412; Pearce, “Counterpossible 
Dependence and the Efficacy of the Divine Will,” 12.
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Note that this view does not imply a radical Cartesian voluntarism on 
which God arbitrarily invents the laws of logic.43 Indeed, the emphasis on 
God’s reasons places it firmly in the (Leibnizian/Thomistic) intellectualist 
camp.44 The claim is that, necessarily and prior to God’s creative decision, 
God knows the laws of logic and values them in a way that guarantees 
that God creates in accord with them. Thus, although this view implies the 
non-trivial truth of the counterpossible conditional, if God were irrational 
there might be true contradictions,45 it does not see the laws of logic as stem-
ming from a divine decree. Rather, these laws are a result of the way God’s 
intellect and character shape God’s willing.46
An alternative Anselmian view would hold that the divine under-
standing is so constituted as never even to consider intrinsically impossi-
ble states of affairs, so that these are excluded entirely from the weighing 
of reasons. Perhaps some Anselmians will want to say that considering 
whether it would be good or bad if there were round squares implies some 
intellectual confusion or other form of imperfection.
It seems to me that this is a mistake. Philosophers engaged in debate 
over whether the Anselmian God exists are up to our ears in non-trivial 
counterpossible conditionals. If these are genuine propositions with truth 
values, they should be within the scope of divine omniscience. Thus, God 
knows how things would be if impossibilities were actual. This will include 
knowledge of how things would be with respect to value if impossibili-
ties were actual, and—at least for a perfectly good, perfectly rational, and 
omnipotent being—the (dis)value of a state of affairs just is a reason for or 
against it. Therefore, God considers reasons for and against even intrinsic 
impossibilities, and intrinsic impossibilities are among God’s options.
This argument depends on two key assumptions: that God’s knowl-
edge can be understood in propositional terms, and that subjunctive con-
ditionals (including counterpossibles) express propositions with objective 
truth values. Although these are both common assumptions in recent 
analytic philosophy, both have been challenged.47 Nevertheless, this line 
43On Descartes’s voluntarism, see Descartes, Meditations, 294; Frankfurt, “The Logic 
of Omnipotence”; Curley, “Descartes on the Creation of the Eternal Truths”; Bennett, 
“Descartes’s Theory of Modality.”
44On Leibniz’s account of the dependence of the modal facts on God, see Adams, Leibniz, 
ch. 7; Newlands, “Leibniz and the Ground of Possibility.”
45See Pearce, “Counterpossible Dependence and the Efficacy of the Divine Will,” 8.
46Further note that this view is fully consistent with the standard modal system S5. God’s 
impossible options are necessarily impossible, since the explanation for their impossibility is 
to be found in a necessary feature of God’s character, and this necessity (like all necessities, 
according to S4 and the strictly stronger S5) is a necessary necessity.
47For non-propositional conceptions of divine knowledge, see Alston, “Does God 
Have Beliefs?”; Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge, 59–62; Burrell, Freedom and Creation. For 
“epistemicizing” accounts of subjunctive conditionals, which deny that they have objec-
tive truth values, see Edgington, “Counterfactuals”; Brogaard and Salerno, “Remarks on 
Counterpossibles”; Vetter, “Counterpossibles (Not Only) for Dispositionalists,” §4; Kocurek, 
“On the Substitution of Identicals in Counterfactual Reasoning,” §7.
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of argument shows that a collection of assumptions endorsed by many 
contemporary Anselmians leads to an even stronger conclusion than the 
one I defended in sections 1 and 2 above: even logically impossible states 
of affairs, such as a round square’s existence, are among God’s options. 
Contrary to first appearances, this conclusion, radical though it may be, 
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